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swer suggested in Hubbard of broadening the anti-monopoly laws, once ac-
cepted, will provide a ready remedy for any ethical non-member doctor
feeling the force of organized medicine.
DANIEL J. JOHNEDIS
Trade Regulations—Robinson-Patman Act—Cost Justification Defense
to Discriminatory Prices.—United States v. Borden.'—Borden and Bow-
man Companies attempted to defend against a Section 2(a) Clayton Act 2
suit by use of the cost justification proviso which allows price differentials if
they "make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered." Respondents
had admittedly discriminated between independently owned grocery stores
and grocery chain stores by allowing the latter group a higher flat discount
than the highest volume discount allowed to independents. 3 The District
Court allowed the defense and dismissed the injunction,4 but on appeal
the Supreme Court reversed. HELD: The class cost justifications did not
satisfy the burden of proving that the discriminatory prices reflected only
a "due allowance" for cost differences.
The proviso in Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Acts permitting
justification of price differential related to the seller's costs stems from a
comparable provision in Section 2 of the original Clayton Act. The 1936
Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act attempted to strike a
balance between protection of the small merchant from arbitrary and
the detriment of non-members. Furthermore, the court may still be confronted with
precedent which has limited this type cause of action to traditionally commercial
activities. Prosser, The Law of Torts 748 (2d ed. 195.5).
Remedial legislation does not appear to offer a realistic solution in view of the
potent political power organized medicine wields. Supra note 18.
Perhaps the only effective non-judicial answer to the problem is that offered by
Chafee:
When an association has a strangle-hold upon an individual or occupation,
internal decisions upon other questions besides expulsion and admission may
be of much public concern, ... However, the courts have usually refused to
interfere in such internal questions, and perhaps public opinion is a better
method for obtaining fair proceedings. Chaffee, supra note 26, at 1023.
1 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
2 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1961 Supp.),
(Robinson-Patman Act). The suit is referred to as a Clayton Act suit even though the
specific defense and subject of this note is the cost justification proviso introduced as
the Robinson-Patman amendment.
3 Borden Company allowed percentage discounts based on volume on a sliding
scale basis up to a maximum of 4%. The chain stores, however, were given flat discounts
up to simfo. Bowman Company had a similar arrangement allowing volume discounts
up to 8% and flat discounts to chains of 11%.
4 The District Court opinion is unreported. The litigants have been involved in
the controversy for nearly twelve years; for this earlier history involving the Clayton
and Sherman Acts, see: United States v. Borden, 111 F. Supp. 562 (1953) ; United States
v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514 (1954).




unfair discrimination on the one hand, and preservation of legitimate price
deductions by mass distributors on the other .s Thus, the price difference may
be exonerated if it does not exceed the cost difference in dealing with various
customers.
This defense available to sellers charged with discrimination has proved
to be a formidable barrier. The Supreme Court construed the law as placing
the burden of proof on the respondent seller charged with unlawful pricing
in the Morton Salt case,7 and since then few respondents have succeeded in
marshalling enough accounting statistics to convince a court that the prices
were cost justified. The justification may be addressed to reasonably homo-
geneous customer groupings whose members receive equivalent price treat-
ment. It is not necessary that the cost be broken down into individual
customers or transactions within the groups. But the groupings may not
be so arbitrary as to favor one or two large customers (e.g., chain stores)
in a single group and all others in a second group for pricing purposes.s
In Borden the justification attempted was based on the average cost
of dealing with broad groups of customers. In holding that these groups
lacked homogeneity, the Court decided that the members of the group were
. unrelated in cost savings factors. How "homogeneous" the groupings must
be defies precise analysis, but the Court alluded to at least one requirement
by stating that there must be a "close resemblance of the individual members
of each group on the essential point or points which determine the costs
considered." In theory, it is possible to cost-justify within customer groupings
by apportioning costs to classes rather than individuals.° In reality, the
defense has been labeled "illusory" by the Attorney General's National
Committee" and "impossible" by an author in the field)' Neither is quite
accurate since several successful defenses have been made, although none
involving the exact point in question as in Borden. 12
A defense, as here, based on average costs of dealing with broad customer
groups seems destined to failure from the beginning. In the instant case
fixed discounts were given to all independents whether individually warranted
6 For background on the legislative history, as well as a thorough analysis of the
act, see Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 265-321 (1962).
7 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
8 See Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
0 See Murray, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Impossibility
Revisited, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 227 (1960) ; Sawyer, Accounting and Statistical Proof
in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 244 (1950).
10
 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, 171 (1955).
11 Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 Yale L.J. 929, 963 (1951).
2 Hamburg Bros., Inc., 54 F.T.C. 1450 (1958) (de minimis rule invoked to allow a
partial defense) ; Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 51 F.T.C. 282 (1954) (quantity discounts
allowed because of no competitive significance) ; B.F. Goodrich, 50 F.T.C. 622 (1954)
(quantity discounts allowed) ; U.S. Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) (cost justification
based on production costs allowed ; also the de minimis rule allowing a price difference
if the cost difference varies insignificantly.) ; Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537
(1937) (good faith quantity discount allowed) ; Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937)
(customer groupings again not involved; respondent here showed a cost difference
of 28% as compared to a price difference of 20%).
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or not, based on the average cost of supplying all independents; likewise,
fixed allowances were allotted to all chains, warranted or not. Thus an in-
dependent which conceivably could be a larger operation than an individual
store of a chain is a priori discriminated against. Therefore, no matter how
voluminous the cost study is in attempting to justify the price differences,
it will be to no avail since the defense is defective conceptually.
Cost justification, by its nature, is a difficult defense. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said in Automatic Canteen v. FTC, "Cost Justification, being
what it is, too often no one can ascertain whether a price is cost justified."' 3
The statement appears amply justified by the realistic problems of cost
accounting. Functional costs, for example, may be allocated to customer
groups if three principles are followed: (1) The discount class must not be
too large; (2) The • boundaries between the customer classes must be
reasonably placed, i.e., where costs change most conspicuously; (3) No class
should receive a discount which is excessive as compared with another class."
These costs, however, which are to be compared for defense purposes are
not always apparent. They should take into account every allowance, rebate,
discount, etc., or in sum, all financial considerations which pass from seller
to buyer. The accounting problems, therefore, are visibly superimposed on
the basic legal problems underlying the cost justification proviso.
The impact of the Borden decision is that no cost analysis constructed'
on the basis of a customer classification by ownership and providing average
costs for the resulting groups can be used to justify discriminations among
customers regardless of the actual costs of doing business with each. No
matter how detailed the accounting justification, the defense will fail
because of the incipient defect.
J. NORMAN BAKER
Workmen's Compensation—Second Injury Fund—Accessibility Re-
quirements When Second Injury Follows Latent Disability.—Pittson
Stevedoring Corp. v. Hughes.'—The claimant, while employed as a long-
shoreman by Nessa Corp., sustained an injury to his back. A compensation
order found him to be totally disabled from January 30 until February 26,
1952 and partially disabled from February 27, 1952 to June 14, 1953. On
June 13, 1953 the claimant, while working as a longshoreman for the Pittson
Company, sustained a second injury to his back and in a subsequent compen-
sation order was found to be totally disabled from June 15, 1953 to Novem-
ber 25, 1954 and partially disabled from November 26, 1954 to April 4, 1957.
Each of the insurance carriers, on behalf of its insured employer, continued to
make bi-weekly payments pursuant to the compensation award until each had
paid to the claimant the sum of $10,000, the statutory limit at the time of the
accident for permanent partial disability. The claimant then made applica-
la 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
14 See Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 j.
Accountancy 480 (1938).
1 198 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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